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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
"LET THE SURFACE-BUYER BEWARE"
With the mining of every additional ton of coal in Pennsylvania, the problem
presented by the unlimited removal thereof becomes more acute. Ordinarily where
on% person owns the surface of land and another the subjacent land, or the minerals
therein, the owner of the surface is entitled to have it remain in its natural condi-
tion, without any subsidence caused by the withdrawal of the land or minerals
thereunder by the subjacent owner.' He is entitled to absolute support of his land,
not as an easement or right depending on a supposed grant, but as a proprietary
right at common law.2 The failure of the mineral owner to render this support
to the surface will make him liable to the owner thereof, or to the owner of the
right to support, regardless of the nature of the interference whether it be negli-
gent, intentional, or otherwise.' These rules always have been the law of Pennsyl-
vania and the enforcement of them presents little difficulty. However, there arises
the problem of what are the legal results where the owner of the surface has re-
linquished, in some manner, his right to surface support. The manner of relin-
quishment, whether it be by contract, waiver, reservation, or otherwise, is not
within the scope of this discussion. Sufficient is it, that this absolute right has been
relinquished by the owner of the surface. This is the situation as we have it today
in most of our mining communities. The original owners of both the surface and
minerals have in most cases reserved the right to remove support on a sale of the
surface and have often stipulated in these deeds that they shall not be liable even
for negligence in the removal of this coal. Out of this situation the Pennsylvania
courts have upheld the validity of these deeds and contracts and with few excep-
tions have given them their unqualified blessing. Thus, a reservation in the grant
of surface lands of the right to mine the coal thereunder, without incurring in any
event whatever any liability for injury to the surface, prevents recovery, by the
holder of the surface, of damages for loss caused by negligent mining.
4
In Atherton v. Clearview Coal Co.5 this benevolent attitude of the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court was most strikingly exhibited. Here the coal company
"excepted and reserved all minerals and coal with the right to mine
and remove by any subterranean process 'without liability under any
circumstances whatever' for damages done to the surface of said lot
or to the improvements now erected or hereafter to be erected
thereon."
1Carlin & Co. v. Chappel, 101 Pa. 348, 47 Am. Rep. 722 (1882)'. Com. v. Panhandle Mining
Co., 315 Pa. 16, 172 A. 106 (1934).
2Youghiogheny River Coal Co. v. Allegheny Nat. Bank, 211 Pa. 319, 60 A. 924 (1905) ; Pen-
man v. Jones, 256 Pa. 416, 100 A. 1043 (1917).
SLowry v. Hay, 2 Walk. 239; Robertson v. Youghiogheny River Coal Co., 172 Pa. 566, 33 A.
706 (1896) ; Berkey v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 229 Pa. 417, 78 A. 1004 (1911).4
Graff Furnace Co. v. Scranton Coal Co., 266 Fed. 798 (1920); Weakland v. Cymbria Coal
Co., 262 Pa. 403, 105 A. 558 (1918).
6267 Pa. 425, 110 A. 298 (1920).
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The plaintiff averred that the defendant coal company while engaged in mining
its coal
"negligently and carelessly used and employed, discharged and fired
large quantities of dynamite and other high explosives in blasting,
thereby causing concussions which broke, cracked, disturbed and
damaged the land and buildings."
The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Stewart, held that:
"The only negligence averred, to which the injuries complained of
could be referredas the antecedent and proximate cause, was the care-
less and negligent use, in conducting mining operations, of large
quantities of dynamite and other high explosives in blasting ....
with the plaintiff's cause of action based on negligence thus defined,
defendant was not liable for the injuries alleged, but was exempt
therefrom under the exception and reservation contained in plaintiff's
deed."
Lest this be an insufficient basis for the decision in this case, Mr. Justice Stew-
art fortified his views by further stating that
"the reservation did not contravene public policy, especially as it did
not involve personal rights protected by the Constitution."
Surely, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not mean to inaugurate a policy
of "anything goes" in regard to the mining of coal. A survey of some other cases
would certainly not lead to such a conclusion if the tenor of some of the statements
therein is to be any sort of criterion. Just when, then, should a person be entitled
to recover damages if he as owner of the surface has given up his absolute right of
subjacent support and has also contracted against liability of the owner of the coal
for negligence in the extraction of coal? Mr. Justice Simpson, in a concurring
opinion in which he was joined by Mr. Justice Kephart in the Atherton v. Clear-
tview 6 case, by way of dicta stated the extent to which a release of liability for negli-
gence should extend. He said:
"If the statement of claim had averred that the defendant had wil-
fully or wantonly used an excessive quantity of high explosives in
order to obtain the coal, and by reason of such excessive use plain-
tiff's property was injured, or if it had averred that the quantity of
high explosives which defendant used was so excessive that it knew
or was bound to know before exploding them that unnecessary in-
jury would be inflicted on plaintiff's property, and sought recovery
for such unnecessary injury, the statement would charge an action-
able offense, nowithstanding the release."
In these words the intent is showh clearly not to allow a release to absolve the
offending party from all responsibility which his acts might bring upon himself.
If we consider the nature of a release and place ourselves in the position of the
parties to an agreement for such, we see at once that the owner of the surface cer-
tainly never intended his home and land to be the plaything for the indiscriminate
61bid.
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use of the miner and coal operator. The average surface owner in a mining com-
munity when purchasing his land is in most cases unappreciative of the terms of
deeds and contracts which are given to him when the purchase is completed. Years
later, perhaps, he is rather unhappily made aware of the effects of the waivers, re-
leases and reservations with which his agreement was studded. In effect, the courts
have met this situation by the use of the "caveat emptor" doctrine. In Madden v.
Lehigh Valley Coal Co. the grantor reserved the right to remove surface support.
The court held that avoidance of liability for injury to the surface however caused,
by negligence or otherwise, was the very object of the reservation. Therefore, the
grantee had no right to support, and could not recover for failure of support, even
if that had been caused by negligent mining. Here the owner of the mineral
rights protected himself from liability even for negligent mining, merely by such
a stipulation in his deed. Hardship in such a situation? The court answered that,
thusly:
"Presumably he got his land cheaper by reason of this disadvantage
and whether so or not that was his bargain."
Fortunately this has not been the attitude of all of the judges of the Pennsyl-
vania courts. Even in Atherton v. Clearview Coal Co.,8 the court must have felt a
twinge of conscience, for, by way of dicta, the court sought to minimize the extent
of its holding by attempting to create a sharp line of distinction between contract-
ing away personal rights and property rights:
"Were it a contract to exempt from liability for damages where the
negligence resulted in loss of life or permanent physical disability of
the person, much might be said in support of the contention that it
was against public policy. But that question is not before us. We
merely remark upon it to show a distinction that might be urged be-
tween prospective negligence as the subject of contract for release of
damages when it related to property over which the party has exclu-
sive control, even 'jus disponendi', and the right to deal with it ac-
cording to his own pleasure, save that he may not employ it to the
injury of his neighbor, and negligence charged as an invasion or in-
terference with those sacred and inherent personal rights which are
declared in our bill of rights to be indefeasible, that is, beyond the
right or power of the individual to destroy or alienate."
Particular attention is called to the statement that the land may not be employed to
the injury of his neighbor. Evidently the court here wished to state that so long as
the surface owner owned the land and right of support, restrictions were placed
upon its use. Yet by its decision the court said that just as soon as the surface
owner gave up this right of support the subjacent mineral owner could use it in
any way he saw fit, even to the extent of blasting away and mining his upper
neighbor's land. Evidently, then, the acts of the owner of land must be tempered
and determined by the court's taking cognizance of the ownership of the land at
7212 Pa. 63 (1905).
SSupra, not 5.
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the particular time. Here the acts certainly ruined the neighbor's land but the court
evidently overlooked in its decision what it said by dictum.
However, even with such a humble acknowledgment of certain rights in the
owner of the surface, we can see that there should be limitations upon the manner
in which coal may be taken out when the surface owner has once given up his right
of support. In 1921 the Pennsylvania legislature, realizing the effect this decision
would hare on subsequent mining practice in Pennsylvania, passed an act known
as the "Kohler Act." This statute forbade the mining of anthracite coal in such
way as to cause the subsidence of, among other things, any structure used as a
human habitation. Certain exceptions, including among them land where the sur-
face is owned by the owner of the underlying coal and is distant more than 150
feet from any improved property belonging to any other person, were specifically
mad'e. This statute had as its basis the general right of the state to act through its
police power to protect the general health, welfare, and safety of its citizens. This
statute was attacked on constitutional grounds in Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal
Co.10 A bill in equity had been brought by the Mahons to prevent the defendant
coal company from mining under their property in such way as to remove the sup-
port and to cause a subsidence of the surface and of their house. The bill set out a
deed executed by the coal company in 1878, under which the plaintiffs claimed.
The deed conveyed the surface, but in express terms reserved the right to remove
all the coal under the same, and the grantee took the premises with the risk, and
waived all claim for damages that might arise from mining the coal.
In upholding the constitutionality of the act, Chief Justice Moschzisker stated:
"ln order to serve the public welfare, the state under its police power may lawfully
impose such restrictions upon private rights as, in the wisdom of the Legislature,
may be deemed expedient; for all property in this country is held under the implied
obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community."
The fact that the owner of the surface had by his contract waived surface sup-
port was held not to be a bar against his coming within the general rule that per-
sons with a special interest may have public nuisances abated at their own suit. It
was not necessary, however, to depend upon the owner's special interest, for, under
the act he was viewed as moving the court to enforce a general rule of public policy
intended for the protection of the whole community rather than acting simply for
his own protection. This ruling was a recognition of the fact that a mere waiver
of the right of support by the surface owner was not to be construed as a mutual
private condemnation of the surface by the reckless and negligent mining of the
coal beneath. Virtually it attempted to re-establish a right of surface support where
't had been released. Its purpose was to act as a check on unbridled miningi of the
lower surface. However, this victory was short-lived. On appeal to the United
States Supreme Court the decision was reversed and the act was held to be uncon-
9Act of May 27, 1921, P. L. 1198.
10274 Pa. 489, 118 A. 491 (1922).
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stitutional, as a taking of property without due process of law. 1 One of the rea-
sons given for the decision was that "so far as private persons or communities have
seen fit to take the risk of acquiring only surface rights, we cannot see that the fact
that their risk has become a danger warrants the giving to them greater rights than
they bought'--a complete reversion to the doctrine of "caveat emptor". The sur-
face owner now was faced with the fact that his surface was likely to be sunk into
a mine, his home destroyed, his land made valueless, and in effect his purchase
price turned into a gift to the coal company. This, the Supreme Court said, was the
value of his bargain. Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented from the rule of the majority,
upheld the constitutionality of the Kohler Act, and declared it to be a lawful exer-
cise of the police power. In expanding this view he stated: "Coal in place is land;
and the right of the owner to use his land is not absolute. He may not so use it as
to create a public nuisance; and uses, once harmless, may, owing to changed condi-
tions, seriously threaten the public welfare. Whenever they do, the Legislature has
power to prohibit such uses without paying compensation; and the power to pro-
hibit extends alike to the manner, the character, and the purpose of the use."
Since this decision by the Supreme Court of the United States, the law on the
subject of subjacent support has remained in a static condition. Mr. Justice Bran-
deis had attempted to break away from the conception of a law which would make
no provision for a situation which had not been anticipated. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court had tried to do the same in upholding the Kohler Act, but both
were repulsed. Time has not lessened the problem, but rather has increased the
magnitude of it.
It cannot seriously be questioned that the owner of the surface in buying his
land and giving up his right to recover for negligence in the removal of the coal,
either never realized what he was doing or never intended it to be an unlimited
destruction of his property. Are we to say that only the grossest of negligence
directed at the personal rights of the owner of the surface will give to him a cause
of action? This certainly should not be the answer. In many cases the coal com-
panies have themselves acknowledged this to be so. The more enlightened com-
panies, although legally not bound to provide compensation for the loss of homes
which have been swallowed up, have voluntarily done so. Homes, schools, and
even churches have been repaired and restored. Here we have a tacit admission
that justice can only be done by making provision for the luckless owner of a home
which has been the victim of a "cave-in". It is rather paradoxical that such an ad-
mission should come from the owner of the mineral and right of support and yet
will not be acknowledged by the courts of Pennsylvania.
A step toward the elimination of indiscriminate mining was taken by the
Permsylvania legislature in 1933 with the passage of the Highway Mining Act. 12
This act, dealing only with the state highways which are underlaid by coal, made
11260 U. S. 393 (1922).
121933, P. L. 1409.
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provision for the retention of subjacent support to these highways. In 193718 the
act was amended and a Highway Mining Commission was formed. This commis-
sion has judicial powers and has exclusive jurisdiction over the mining of coal
within or under the right of way of state highways. In 1940 a check was placed
upon the commission when it attempted to waive surface support beneath a high-
way merely because the removal thereof would not endanger the traveling public.
It was held that the scope of the commission's power was limited to determining
the required amount of coal which must be left beneath or adjacent to the highway,
rather than the amount of coal which could be removed without danger to the
traveling public. 14
In 1941 this act was further amended by the creation of the State Mining
Commission.15 This act extended the Act of 1933, as amended, to all lands, ease-
ments and rights of way purchased, condemned or otherwise acquired by the Com-
monwealth. The commission was given the authority to waive vertical and lateral
support therefor under certain conditions, to acquire the right to lateral and vertical
support and to assess damages for coal required to be left in place. The principal
objection to the Kohler Act, namely the confiscation of private property, has been
taken care of in this act by making provision for compensation for minerals left in
place or property condemned.
Although the commission has been formed to deal primarily with state lands
in relation to highways, the very existence of such is an admission of the acuteness
of the problem of subjacent support. Extensive efforts have been made to pass
legislation which would give relief to the individual property owner but they have
all come to naught."6 Whether more success will come to these efforts as the dam-
ages from subsidences grow greater remains to be seen. A corresponding growth
in public indignation might aid in accomplishing this result.
BERNARD J. KOTULAK
131937, P. L. 891.
14Glen Alden Coal Company's Case, 339 Pa. 149 (1940).
15Act of the General Assembly No. 120, approved July 3, 1941.
161t is interesting to note that during the past legislative session eight bills dealing directly
with the problem of mining and surface support were introduced in the House of Representatives.
Some of these bills attempted to nullify clauses for non-liability on thq part of the mineral owners
to the surface owners while others attempted to give a right of damages to surface owners for subsi-
dences. Bills attempting to do such were given a legislative death by referring them to various com-
mittees. In the Senate, two bills were introduced in regard to surface subsidence and were subse-
quently enacted into laws.
